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Abstract—The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as delivery
systems of online goods is rapidly becoming a global norm, as
corroborated by Amazon’s “Prime Air” and Google’s “Project
Wing” projects. However, the real-world deployment of such drone
delivery systems faces many cyber-physical security challenges. In
this paper, a novel mathematical framework for analyzing and
enhancing the security of drone delivery systems is introduced. In
this regard, a zero-sum network interdiction game is formulated
between a vendor, operating a drone delivery system, and a
malicious attacker. In this game, the vendor seeks to find the optimal
path that its UAV should follow, to deliver a purchase from the
vendor’s warehouse to a customer location, to minimize the delivery
time. Meanwhile, an attacker seeks to choose an optimal location
to interdict the potential paths of the UAVs, so as to inflict cyber
or physical damage to it, thus, maximizing its delivery time. First,
the Nash equilibrium point of this game is characterized. Then, to
capture the subjective behavior of both the vendor and attacker, new
notions from prospect theory are incorporated into the game. These
notions allow capturing the vendor’s and attacker’s i) subjective
perception of attack success probabilities, and ii) their disparate
subjective valuations of the achieved delivery times relative to a
certain target delivery time. Simulation results have shown that
the subjective decision making of the vendor and attacker leads to
adopting risky path selection strategies which inflict delays to the
delivery, thus, yielding unexpected delivery times which surpass the
target delivery time set by the vendor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Drone and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-assisted delivery
systems are rapidly moving from fiction to reality [1], [2]. Recent
examples include Google’s “Project Wing” that has recently
tested its drones as part of a food delivery system at Virginia
Tech [1] and the “Amazon Prime Air” program through which
online shoppers will be given the opportunity of choosing UAV
delivery as a 30-minutes delivery option [2].
However, the implementation of such drone delivery systems
is faced with a set of technical challenges ranging from optimized
navigation [3]–[5] to UAV control and system security. In
particular, drone delivery systems are vulnerable to a myriad
of cyber and physical attacks. On the physical side, to avoid
conflict with manned aviations, the altitude of UAVs is limited
to around 400 ft [2] which puts them in the range of civilian-
owned hunting rifles which can target them [6]. Moreover, on
the cyber side, UAVs are vulnerable to a range of cyber threats
targeting their communication links with ground control, as well
as with other air units [7]–[9]. In fact, a number of recent works
have characterized a handful of cybersecurity threats against
UAVs [7]–[9]. For example, the work in [7] provided a general
overview of cyber attacks which can target the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of UAV systems. The work in [8]
focused on the security of the communications links between
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ground control and unmanned aircrafts, exposing the underlying
threats on UAV controllability and operation. Moreover, the work
in [9] provided a demonstration in which the authors successfully
launched data injection attacks against a typical UAV used by
law enforcement agencies for critical applications.
Even though UAVs used in drone delivery systems are also
subject to such physical [6] and cyber attacks [7]–[9], the emerg-
ing research on drone delivery systems [3]–[5], surprisingly,
merely focuses on enhancing the efficiency and precision of the
UAVs, and enabling their integration with manned aviation, with
little to no focus on addressing and analyzing the underlying
security challenges. Moreover, the works in [7]–[9] are either
qualitative or focused on isolated military drone experiments that
do not necessarily capture the cyber-physical security threats in
drone delivery systems. To the best of our knowledge, no work
has focused on studying the security of UAV delivery systems
against cyber-physical attacks.
The main contribution of this paper is to develop the first com-
prehensive analysis of the cyber-physical security of drone-based
delivery systems. In particular, we consider a zero-sum network
interdiction game between a vendor (delivering purchases via
UAVs) and a malicious attacker. In this game, the vendor,
referred to as an evader, seeks to choose the optimal path strategy
for its UAV, from the warehouse to a customer location, to evade
attacks along the way and minimize its expected delivery time.
On the other hand, the attacker or interdictor, aims at choosing
the optimal attack locations along the paths traversed by the UAV
to interdict the UAV, causing cyber or physical damage, with the
goal of maximizing the delivery time. We then show that this
network interdiction game is equivalent to a zero-sum matrix
game whose Nash equilibrium (NE) can be derived by solving
two linear programming (LP) problems. We then prove that the
value functions of these LPs can be directly used to compute the
expected delivery time under the NE strategies.
Moreover, to capture the potential subjective behavior of the
vendor and the attacker, we incorporate tools from prospect
theory (PT) [10], a Nobel prize-winning decision theory, in the
game formulation. The incorporation of PT enables modeling
i) the subjective perceptions of the likelihood of a potential
attack to be successful, and ii) the subjective assessment of an
achieved delivery time, pertaining to the vendor and attacker. In
fact, the merit of a drone delivery system lies in its ability of
meeting a certain short target delivery time (e.g. 30 mins for
Amazon Prime Air [2], or shorter and stricter time restrictions
for medical and safety applications [3], [4]). Thus, an achieved
delivery time is naturally assessed with respect to this target
delivery time rather than as an absolute quantity. As such, using
PT, we model the way in which each of the players, vendor
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Fig. 1. Threat points from warehouse (O) to customer location (D).
and attacker, subjectively values delivery time relative to their
reference point which can represent, for example, the target
delivery time. Our results show that such subjective perceptions
and decision making, of the vendor and attacker, lead to the
adoption of risky path selection strategies which cause delays to
the delivery and, hence, lead to delivery times which can exceed
the target delivery time set by the vendor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents our system model. Section III introduces the formulated
network interdiction game while Section IV discusses the PT
version of this game. Section V presents a number of numerical
results while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a drone delivery system in which a UAV is used
for delivering online purchases, similarly to the paradigms of
by Amazon [2] and Project Wing [1]. Once an online order is
placed, the vendor will schedule its UAV to deliver the product
from a warehouse location, O, to the customer’s delivery loca-
tion, D. The goal of the vendor is to minimize the delivery time
(and transportation cost) and, hence, it chooses the shortest path
from O to D. However, as shown in Fig. 1, an adversary might
be located at a number of locations or “danger points” (such
as i and j in Fig. 1), along this path aiming to launch a cyber
or physical attack targeting the UAV. A successful attack leads
to the destruction of the UAV which then requires re-sending
a similar product from O to D, therefore, incurring significant
delays. Thus, the expected delivery time of the package is
directly dependent on the probability of a successful attack on the
UAV along its delivery path. To minimize the expected delivery
time, rather than solely considering the shortest physical path,
the vendor can consider alternative paths which can potentially
decrease the expected delivery time. Such alternative paths may
also include danger points.
The set of danger points represents inevitable locations, situ-
ated along the possible paths from O to D, from which attacks
can be carried out. Such locations can represent points that
expose the UAV, such as high hills or high buildings, located
between O and D. These high locations represent a source of
threat since they allow a line-of-sight between the attacker and
the UAV as well as spatial proximity. Thus, they enable targeting
a traversing UAV with physical (such as shooting the UAV) and
cyber (such as jamming) attacks. To model the possible delivery
paths from O to D, we consider an O to D network represented
by a directed graph G(N , E) as shown in Fig. 2. In this graph,
N is the set of N nodes, or vertices which represent the danger
points between O and D, and E is the set of E edges.
In practice, given that the UAV may not be limited by
predefined airways1, there can be an infinite number of paths
connecting O and D. Each such path will include a subset of
danger points, and different paths might share common danger
1Our system can still accommodate a future case in which the UAV may be
regulated to a small set of paths.
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Fig. 2. Warehouse-to-customer security graph.
points. Thus, from a security perspective, this large set of
possible paths can be captured by the set of danger points
that each path traverses. Now, considering each two neighboring
danger points, such as nodes 3 and 5 in Fig. 2, there can exist an
infinite number of ways in which a drone can move from point m
to point n. However, given that the vendor aims at minimizing the
delivery time, the infinite set of edges connecting m to n can only
be represented by the shortest edge between the two vertices.
Thus, the graph G includes only the shortest paths between each
two danger points. As such, G(N , E) is a security model which
represents the continuous geographical space between O and D
in terms of its danger points and the shortest edges connecting
them. Moreover, if edge ek ∈ E connects two neighboring danger
points m and n, we let tk be the time needed by the UAV to
travel from m to n over ek. We also let pn be the probability with
which an attack launched from a location n ∈ N is successful.
Let H be the set of H simple paths (with no repeated vertices)
from O to D over the graph G. In this respect, h ∈ H is a
sequence of nodes and edges which connect O to D. Within
each h, the nodes and edges are unique, and thus, we represent
h by its sequence of traversed nodes. Each path h ∈ H, hence,
constitutes a subset of N . For example, h1 , (1, 2, 5, 7, 10) is
a path from O to D in Fig. 2. To this end, we define the path-
node incidence matrix L of size (H × N) with each element
lhn, ∀h ∈ H ,∀n ∈ N , being: lhn = 1 if n ∈ h, and lhn = 0
otherwise. In addition, we define, fh(.) : h → R, as a distance
function over path h ∈ H which takes as input a node n ∈ h
and returns the time to reach this node n from the origin O,
following path h. For example, in Fig. 2, fh1(5) = t1 + t4
where h1 , (1, 2, 5, 7, 10).
Given graph G, the vendor, U , is an evader aiming at choosing
an optimal path for its UAV from O to D to evade the attack and
minimize the expected delivery time, T . On the other hand, the
adversary, A, is an interdictor which aims at choosing a node
(a danger point) from which to launch the attack and interdict
the path of the UAV while maximizing T . As such, we model
the decision making processes of U and A using a zero-sum
network interdiction game [11] on graph G as defined next.
III. GAME FORMULATION AND SOLUTION METHOD
A. Game Formulation
In the proposed game, the vendor aims at choosing an optimal
probability distribution y , [y1, y2, ..., yH ]T ∈ Y over the
set of possible paths, H, from O to D (mixed path-selection
strategy) where Y = {y ∈ RH : y ≥ 0,∑Hh=1 yh = 1}.
Randomizing between its path selection strategies is beneficial
to the vendor so as not to make it trivial for the adversary to
guess the admitted path. A similar randomization logic can be
used by the attacker. Indeed, the attacker will choose an optimal
probability distribution x , [x1, x2, ..., xN ]T ∈ X over the set,
N , of possible attack locations (i.e. mixed interdiction-location
strategy) where X = {x ∈ RN : x ≥ 0,∑Nn=1 xn = 1}.
For an attacker located at node n (along the path of the UAV),
the attack’s success probability is given by pn. When the attack is
successful, the UAV is interdicted/destroyed and, hence, a new
item needs to be sent from O. Thus, when the UAV reaches
a certain n ∈ h, it may continue its path h unaffected with
probability (1 − pn) or it will be destroyed with probability
pn which is equivalent to being sent back to the starting point
O. Here, we assume that, when the item is re-sent, the path h
which was taken at the first attempt will be cleared from potential
threats by law enforcement agencies (due to the reported previous
security breach) thus allowing U to safely send a replacement
along path h without the threat of any interdiction2. Given that yh
is the probability with which the vendor chooses path h ∈ H and
xn is the probability with which the attacker chooses location
n ∈ N , the expected delivery time, T , will be:
T =
∑
h∈H
∑
n∈N
yhxn[lhnpn(f
h(n)+fh(D))+(1−lhnpn)fh(D)]
=
∑
h∈H
∑
n∈N
yhxn[lhnpnf
h(n) + fh(D)]. (1)
In this respect, we define an (H × N) matrix M whose
elements are mhn = lhnpnfh(n) + fh(D) ∀h ∈ H and n ∈ N .
Therefore, the expected delivery time can be defined as:
T = yTMx. (2)
Given that the objective of the vendor is to minimize T while
that of the attacker is to maximize T , the vendor’s problem can
be formulated as a min-max problem (P1) as follows:
(P1): T ∗ = min
y
max
x
yTMx, (3)
s.t. 1Nx = 1, 1Hy = 1, (4)
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0, (5)
where 1N , [1, ..., 1]T ∈ RN and 1H , [1, ..., 1]T ∈ RH . The
set of constraints of (P1) are equivalent to restricting x and y
to x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . The attacker’s problem can be expressed
as the max-min counterpart of (P1).
The choice of y and x following, respectively, the min-
max problem (P1) and the max-min problem introduced later
in (13) constitutes the selection of what is known as security
strategies [12]. Security strategies are common when studying
security problems [13] since they consider the opponent to inflict
worst-case scenarios. For example, in the min-max formulation
in (3), the vendor considers that the attacker’s response to any
path strategy y consists of choosing the attack strategy x ∈ X
which will lead to the highest possible expected delivery time
(worst-case scenario to the vendor).
B. Solution Method
By inspecting (3), one can see that the maximization is carried
out as a function of a given y, i.e., the choice of optimal x ∈ X
can depend on y. As such, (3) can be written as: miny∈Y u1(y),
2The relaxation of this assumption can be performed through an alternative
repeated game formulation in which at each time the UAV is successfully
attacked, the whole game repeats. This extension will be subject of future work.
where u1(y) = maxx∈X yTMx ≥ yTMx ∀x ∈ X . By
definition of X as an N -dimensional simplex, the last inequality
can be stated as follows:
MTy ≤ 1Nu1(y). (6)
By performing the change of variables yˆ = y/u1(y), the
min-max problem, (P1), can be re-formulated as a linear pro-
gramming (LP) problem (P2) as follows:
(P2): min
y∈RH
u1(y) (7)
s.t. MT yˆ ≤ 1N , (8)
yˆT1H = 1/u1(y), (9)
y = yˆu1(y), yˆ ≥ 0. (10)
As shown in [12, Chapter 2], the LP problem in (7)-(10) can be
reduced to the following standard maximization problem (P3):
(P3): max
yˆ
yˆT1H (11)
s.t. MT yˆ ≤ 1N , yˆ ≥ 0. (12)
The solution of (P3) returns the optimal yˆ which can be used
to calculate u1(y) as per (9). Hence, given u1(y) and yˆ, we can
compute the optimal y as per (10).
Similarly, the max-min attacker’s problem can be transformed
into a standard minimization problem as follows. The attacker’s
objective function is given by:
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
yTMx. (13)
As can be seen from (13), the minimization operation is
performed as a function of a given x. Thus, we let
u2(x) = min
y∈Y
yTMx and xˆ = x/u2(x). (14)
Following similar derivations as the ones we carried out for the
min-max problem (from problem (P1) to (P2) and then to (P3)),
the max-min problem in (13) can be reduced to the following
standard minimization problem (P4):
(P4): min
xˆ
xˆT1N , (15)
s.t. Mxˆ ≥ 1H , xˆ ≥ 0. (16)
The solution of (P4) returns the optimal xˆ which can be used
to calculate u2(x) (similarly to (9)): xˆ
T1N = 1/u2(x). As
a result, given the optimal xˆ and u2(x), we can compute the
optimal x as per (14).
The solutions of the LP problems (P3) and (P4) induce a
mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), of the network interdic-
tion game, defined next.
Definition 1: The strategy profile (y∗,x∗), is an NE (equiv-
alently a saddle-point equilibrium (SPE)) if and only if:
(y∗)TMx∗ ≤ (y)TMx∗ ∀y ∈ Y, (17)
(y∗)TMx∗ ≥ (y∗)TMx ∀x ∈ X . (18)
Based on the solutions of (P3) and (P4), the NE expected
delivery time T ∗ can be determined as shown in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: The solution strategies (y∗,x∗) constitute an
NE of the network interdiction game, and the solutions of LP
problems (P3) and (P4) result in value functions µ1(yˆ
∗) =
(yˆ∗)T1H and µ2(xˆ
∗) = (xˆ∗)T1N satisfying µ1(yˆ
∗) =
µ2(xˆ
∗) = 1/T.
Proof: The proposed network interdiction game is a finite
zero-sum game, defined over matrix M , in which U ’s and A’s
expected payoffs, for a mixed strategy pair (y,x), are given by
ΠA(y,x) = −ΠU (y,x) = yTMx = T . In any finite zero-
sum game, if y′ is a mixed security strategy for player 1 and
x′ is a mixed security strategy for player 2, then (y′,x′) is an
NE of this game [12]. Thus, since y∗ and x∗ are mixed security
strategies for the finite zero-sum network interdiction game, (y∗,
x∗) constitute an NE of that game.
Given the equivalence between (P2) and (P3), and following
from (9) we can derive the following:
u1(y
∗) = [(yˆ∗)T1H ]−1 ⇒ u1(y∗) = 1/µ1(yˆ∗). (19)
However, by definition of u1(y) and T ∗,
u1(y
∗) = min
y∈Y
u1(y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
yTMx = T ∗. (20)
Thus, based on (19) and (20),
µ1(yˆ
∗) = (yˆ∗)T1H = 1/u1(y∗) = 1/T.
Using a similar derivation, it can be proven that
µ2(xˆ
∗) = (xˆ∗)T1N = 1/u2(x∗) = 1/T.
The proposed game might admit multiple NEs (multiple
security strategies for each player). However, due to the zero-
sum nature of the game, all these NEs will result in the same
achieved expected delivery time [12]. Moreover, these NEs are
interchangeable [12]. In other words, if (y∗,x∗) and (y′,x′) are
two NEs, then, (y∗,x′) and (y′,x∗) are also NEs.
IV. PROSPECT-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In classical game theory (CGT), each player’s expected payoff
is calculated following expected utility theory (EUT). Based on
EUT, CGT considers that a player, vendor or attacker, assesses
the likelihood of achieving a certain delivery time objectively and
values the merit of a pair of strategies (y,x) rationally based
on the expected value of the payoff they achieve under these
probabilistic strategies, as shown in (1) and equivalently in (3).
However, as shown in various empirical studies and behavioral
experiments [10], [14], when faced with risk and uncertainty
(as is the case of our network interdiction game), the decision
making processes of individuals can significantly deviate from
this full rationality, which is assumed by EUT and CGT. As
such, when making decisions, humans have been found to assess
outcomes, and probabilities, subjectively [10], [14]. This is of
particular interest to our network interdiction game for various
reasons. First, the vendor or attacker can have inaccurate and
disparate perceptions of the probability of success of an attack
carried out at a given node. Thus, the risk level of a chosen
path, or the merit of a chosen attack location can be perceived
subjectively. Second, the value of the expected delivery time
can be assessed, by the vendor and attacker, subjectively and
differently from EUT. Since the merit of drone delivery systems
lies in their ability of achieving very fast delivery, it is of utmost
importance for the vendor to meet the delivery time, T o, that
it has promised to achieve. For example, Amazon Prime Air
promises a delivery time of less than 30 minutes [2]. Conse-
quently, in practice, a delivery time is not assessed as an absolute
quantity but relative to the reference point T o. An increase
in the expected delivery time above T o can be significantly
detrimental to the vendor. For example, a delayed delivery,
above 30 minutes, would cause significant Amazon Prime Air
customer dissatisfaction which might lead to the failure of the
UAV-delivery program. Moreover, for critical applications, such
as emergency medicine delivery [3], [4], very short delays can
have tragic consequences. In this regard, one of the drawbacks
of using EUT is that it perceives the calculated expected delivery
time as an absolute quantity on which the vendor and attacker
objectively base their chosen strategies rather than as a relative
quantity, with respect to T o, which can be valued subjectively
based on the player.
To this end, to accurately capture the vendor’s and attacker’s
potential subjective perceptions, we incorporate the principles of
prospect theory [10], [14] in our game. PT is a Nobel prize-
winning theory which has been shown to more accurately model
and predict decision makers’ subjective behavior, preference,
and valuations, compared to EUT. Using PT, the subjective
perception of the likelihood of a probabilistic delivery time and
its subjective assessment with respect to a reference point, such
as T o, can be accurately captured and modeled as shown next.
Instead of merely calculating the expected delivery time, T ,
we focus on the valuation Vz(T ) for z ∈ {U,A} that the vendor,
U , or the attacker, A, associates with a certain T . Based on (1),
this valuation can be expressed as follows (for z ∈ {U,A}):
Vz(T )=
∑
h∈H
∑
n∈N
yhxn
[
vz
(
lhnωz(pn)f
h(n)+fh(D)−Rz
)]
.
(21)
In (21), ωz(.) : [0, 1] → R is a nonlinear weighting function
and vz(.) : R→ R is a nonlinear value function. The weighting
function in (21) captures the subjective perception that the vendor
or attacker has of the likelihood of occurrence of probabilistic
outcomes. In our network interdiction game, the outcome, when
the vendor chooses path h ∈ H and the attacker chooses attack
node n ∈ h, corresponds to the achieved delivery time and is
probabilistic due to the underlying probabilistic success of the
attack. In fact, when U chooses h and A chooses n ∈ h, the
achieved delivery time can be (fh(n)+fh(D)) with probability
pn and fh(D) with probability (1 − pn). In this regard, rather
than objectively observing the probability with which each of
these two outcomes can occur, each player views a weighted
or distorted version of it. In this respect, player z ∈ {U,A},
perceives the probability that the delivery time would be equal
to fh(n)+fh(D) when U chooses h and A chooses n ∈ h to be
equal to wz(pn), which is a nonlinear transformation mapping
of the objective probability pn to a subjective weight wz(pn).
This is known as the weighting effect [10]. This transformation
is defined based on various empirical studies conducted in [10],
[14] which have proven that, in real-life decision making, players
tend to underweight high probability outcomes and overweight
low probability outcomes. To accurately model the subjective
probability perceptions of each player z ∈ {U,A}, we use the
Prelec function [15] defined as follows (for a probability pn):
wz(pn) = e
−(− ln pn)γz , 0 < γi ≤ 1, (22)
In addition to the weighting function, the value function in (21)
captures how the vendor and attacker value outcomes as gains
and losses with respect to their reference point Rz (which can,
for example, correspond to T o) rather than as absolute quantities.
This is known as the framing effect [10], [14] based on which
the value function of the vendor will take the following form:
vU (aU ) =
{
λU (aU )
βU , if aU ≥ 0,
−(−aU )αU , if aU < 0, (23)
where aU = lhnωU (pn)fh(n) + fh(D)−RU , (24)
while λU , βU , and αU are positive constants (with λU > 1) and
ωU (.) is as given in (22). In fact, since the vendor is a minimizer,
aU ≥ 0 correspond to losses and aU < 0 corresponds to gains.
This value function captures the following PT-specific properties:
i) the value that the vendor associates with a certain delivery time
is assessed as a gain or loss with respect to a subjective reference
point RU (e.g. T o) rather than as an absolute quantity, and ii)
losses loom larger than gains, as measured by the loss multiplier
λU in (23), which captures the fact that the vendor amplifies the
effect of crossing the promised delivery time. For the attacker, a
similar expression for the value function as in (23) can be used
while adjusting for the fact that the attacker is a maximizer:
vA(aA) =
{ −λA(−aA)βA , if aA < 0,
(aA)
αA , if aA ≥ 0, (25)
where aA = lhnωA(pn)fh(n) + fh(D)−RA. (26)
In addition, to incorporate PT in our network interdiction
game, we define the (H×N) matrices MU,PT and MA,PT whose
elements are, respectively, given by (∀h ∈ H ,∀n ∈ N ):
mU,PT = vU
(
lhnωU (pn)f
h(n)+fh(D)−RU
)
, (27)
mA,PT = vA
(
lhnωA(pn)f
h(n)+fh(D)−RA
)
. (28)
As such, to choose its mixed path-selection strategy, the
vendor must solve the following optimization problem, (P5):
min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
yTMU,PTx. (29)
On the other hand, the defender solves the following optimiza-
tion problem, (P6):
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
yTMA,PTx. (30)
In practice, neither the vendor nor the attacker will have
full knowledge about the subjectivity level of their opponent.
Hence, a common practice in security settings [13] is for each
player to consider that the opponent will always choose the
strategy that inflicts the worst consequence on this player. This
property has been captured, respectively, by the min-max and
max-min formulations of (P5) and (P6). Problem (P5) and
(P6) can be reduced, respectively, into standard maximization
and minimization problems following a similar transformation
process as the one described in Section III. As opposed to the
analysis in Section III, however, here we will not have an SPE
sinceMU,PT andMA,PT are different and, in such cases, security
strategies for the players do not generally lead to an SPE [12].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For our numerical simulations, we consider a directed graph
with N = 10 nodes and E = 18 edges as shown in Fig. 2. We
choose [t1, t2, ..., t18] , [3, 3, 3, 6, 6, 3, 6, 6, 6, 8, 6, 8, 10,
10, 10, 14, 12, 14] and [p1, p2,...,p10] , [0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.4,
0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 0.5, 0]. We number the paths as follows: [1, 2, ...,
18] , [(2, 5, 7), (2, 5, 8), (2, 5, 9), (2, 6, 7), (2, 6, 8), (2, 6, 9),
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Fig. 4. a) Objective and subjective perceptions of pn, b) Optimal interdiction
strategy under CGT and PT – for various values of the rationality parameter.
(3, 5, 7), (3, 5, 8), (3, 5, 9), (3, 6, 7), (3, 6, 8), (3, 6, 9), (4, 5, 7),
(4, 5, 8), (4, 5, 9), (4, 6, 7), (4, 6, 8), (4, 6, 9)] where, since node
1 (O) and node 10 (D) are part of all paths, a path (i, j, k)
corresponds to (1, i, j, k, 10) . Moreover, for the PT parameters,
unless stated otherwise, we take λA = λU = 5, βU = βA = 0.8,
and αU = αA = 0.2.
First, in Fig. 3a, we show the length from O to D for each
of the possibles paths in H. This figure shows that the shortest
path is path 8 followed by paths 2 and 14.
Fig. 3b shows the optimal path strategy chosen by the vendor.
Clearly, under CGT, the shortest path (path 8) is not the one
that is chosen with the highest probability. In fact, the vendor
is more likely to choose either path 7 or 9 due to the fact that
path 8 is risky since p8 = 0.8. However, under PT, the weighting
effect flattens the perceived probabilities as shown in Fig. 4a. In
this regard, Fig. 4a shows the objective probability pn at each
n ∈ N and the distorted weighted versions of these probabilities
for different values of the rationality parameter γ, where in this
case γ = γU = γA. This figure highlights the under-weighting
of high probabilities (pn > 0.4) and the over-weighting of low
probabilities, based on which, a very irrational vendor, γ = 0.1,
perceives the probability of a successful attack to be almost
equally likely at all nodes between O and D. Consequently, as
shown in Fig. 3b, under PT, the defender becomes more likely
to take the shortest path. At this extreme level of rationality,
for γ = 0.1, since the vendor perceives the probability of
a successful attack to be equal among all nodes, the vendor
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Fig. 5. Expected delivery time for various values of the rationality parameter,
γ.
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Fig. 6. Variation with respect to λU of a) Probability of choosing the shortest
path, b) Achieved expected delivery time.
assesses all paths to be equally risky and hence chooses the
shortest path with probability 0.94.
Fig. 4b shows the optimal interdiction strategy of the attacker
under CGT and PT, for different values of γ. Under CGT, the
attacker will optimally choose to randomize between nodes 7,
8, and 9 with the highest probability of launching the attack at
node 8, knowing that node 8 is part of the shortest path and that
p8 = 0.8. However, under PT, the attacker focuses its attack on
nodes 5 and 8 which are part of the shortest paths.
From Figs. 3 and 4, we can see that the weighting effect,
and particularly, the rationality parameter, have a very impactful
effect on the chosen path and attack strategies, hence, signif-
icantly affecting the expected delivery time. In fact, Fig. 5
shows the variation in the achieved expected delivery time for
γ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}. For instance, lower rationality levels lead to
higher delivery times. In fact, when γ decreases from 0.9 to 0.1,
the achieved expected delivery time increases by 11%. Moreover,
in this figure, we consider the target delivery time, T o to be such
that T o = RU = RA = 30. Thus, the distorted perception of
probability leads to choosing risky path strategies which achieve
expected delivery times that exceed the target time. This can have
dire concequences especially in critical and emergency medicine
delivery applications [3], [4]. Here, we note that our calculated
delivery time actually corresponds to the expected flight time of
the UAV when faced with attacks. The actual delivery time will
include additional processing times which can be mathematically
modeled as additive constants. Thus, a successful attack incurs
additional delays since re-sending a replacement product requires
additional time for re-processing and re-handling.
Fig. 6 investigates the effect of the loss parameter λU on the
probability of choosing the shortest path and on the achieved
expected delivery time, for RU = 30. In fact, an increase in λU
reflects that a player exaggerates losses further and hence is more
averse to losses. For our game, when λU increases, the vendor
significantly exaggerates the consequences of not meeting the
target delivery time and, hence, is more likely to choose risky
path strategies that have shorter path lengths. Indeed, as shown
in Fig. 6a, the vendor is significantly more likely to choose the
shortest path when λU increases. In fact, when λU increases from
1 to 10, the probability of choosing the shortest path increases
from 0.51 to 0.81. This risky path selection strategy will have
a negative effect in terms of the expected delivery time. Indeed,
Fig. 6b shows that the expected delivery time increases with
λU . An important observation here is that, under the subjective
behavior observed by PT, the expected delivery time exceeds that
under CGT as well as the target delivery time. Hence, this shows
that the subjective perception of probabilities and outcomes by
the vendor can impair its chosen path strategies incurring delays
to the delivery time.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have introduced a novel mathematical
framework for studying the cyber-physical security of drone
delivery systems against interdiction attacks. We have modeled
the problem using a zero-sum network interdiction game between
a vendor and an attacker. In this regard, we have proven that
the Nash equilibrium of the game can be obtained using the
solution of standard linear programming problems. In addition,
to capture the subjective behavior of the vendor and the attacker,
we have incorporated the notions of prospect theory in our game
formulation. Simulation results have shown that the subjective
decision making processes of the vendor and attacker lead to
delays in delivery time which can surpass the target delivery
time to which the vendor has committed.
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